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ABSTRACT: The objection from the insolvability of principle-based modal 
disagreements appears to support the claim that there are no objective modal facts, or at 
the very least modal facts cannot be accounted for by modal rationalist theories. An idea 
that resurfaced fairly recently in the literature is that the use of ordinary empirical 
statements presupposes some prior grasp of modal notions. If this is correct, then the 
idea that we may have a total agreement concerning empirical facts and disagree on 
modal facts, which is the starting point of the objection from the insolvability of modal 
disagreement, is undercut. This paper examines the no-separation thesis and shows that 
some of the arguments against the classical (empiricist) distinction between empirical 
and modal statements fail to be conclusive if they are taken to defend a strong notion of 
metaphysical possibility. The no-separation thesis appears to work only in theoretical 
frameworks where metaphysical modalities are considered (broadly) conceptual. For 
these reasons, the no-separation thesis cannot save modal rationalism from the 
insolvability of modal disagreement. 
KEYWORDS: metaphysical modality, modal rationalism, principle-based 
account, modal disagreement, Alan Sidelle, Robert Brandom 
 
1. Are There Modal Facts? 
The claim that there is a substantial separation between modal knowledge and 
ordinary knowledge is a staple of (classical) empiricism and it has persisted in a 
radical and dominant form in the analytic tradition of the first half of the past 
century. Although the rehabilitation of modal notions is the joint result of many 
contributions, both logical and philosophical, Kripke is generally credited with the 
decisive role in dispelling the prevalent modal scepticism of the time, which 
originated partially in empiricist doubts about strong modal notions. But Kripke 
also acquiesced to (or at least did not explicitly reject) the idea that there is a 
fundamental distinction between the modal and the non-modal. As a result, the 
attempt to develop and maintain a substantial account of robust metaphysical 
modality while at the same time holding that modalities have an exceptional (viz., 
going beyond empirical evidence) character has been the main challenge of post-
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Kripkean theories of modality. Most of these theories have taken a cue from 
Kripke by explaining metaphysically necessary truths as being derived from 
necessary a priori principles.1 This is the fundamental idea of modal rationalism, 
i.e. the tenet that modal a posteriori truths are dependent on necessary principles 
that are known a priori. 
Now, there is an objection to such principle-based accounts that is, at least 
in my opinion, quite forceful. While I must concede that an adequate 
understanding of its mechanism and significance requires a high degree of 
familiarity with the contemporary literature on the subject matter, I will try to 
summarize this objection in what follows.2 
As already stated above, the modal rationalist holds that necessary a 
posteriori truths are grounded in a priori principles. For instance, it is necessarily 
true that Isabella Rossellini is the daughter of Ingrid Bergman. This modal a 
posteriori truth has its source in the a priori principle called ‘Necessity 
(Essentiality) of origin,’ which states that if a certain thing (living being, artefact, 
etc.) has a certain origin, it has it as a matter of necessity. We just ‘fill in’ this 
principle with some empirical information (such as the fact stated above) and we 
obtain our necessary conclusion by modus ponens. E.g.: 
If Isabella Rossellini is the daughter of Ingrid Bergman, then necessarily, Isabella 
Rosselini is the daughter of Ingrid Bergman.  
Isabella Rossellini is the daughter of Ingrid Bergman. 
Necessarily, Isabella Rossellini is the daughter of Ingrid Bergman. 
The objection to modal rationalism that serves as the starting point of this 
paper can be articulated in the following way. If, as modal rationalists want it, 
modal distinctions are objective, then there is one correct account of modal truth. 
This account is supposed to give us the right image of modal reality, and also 
explain how it is that we come to know it. But it seems plausible that two equally 
sophisticated philosophers who develop their reflections starting from the same 
                                                                
1 A brief formulation of the modal rationalist stance can be found in Saul A. Kripke, Naming and 
Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 109. 
2 See Christopher Peacocke, Being Known (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), for a typical 
rationalist theory concerning modality, Crispin Wright, “On Knowing What is Necessary: Three 
Limitations of Peacocke's Account,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2002): 655-
62, Sonia Roca-Royes, “Modal Epistemology, Modal Concepts and the Integration Challenge,” 
Dialectica 64 (2010): 335-61, and my own paper, “On the Epistemology of Modal Rationalism: 
the Main Problems and Their Significance,” Logos & Episteme. An International Journal of 
Epistemology VI, 1 (2015): 75-94, for a critical assessment of modal rationalism. 
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empirical facts will work out incompatible accounts of modal truth and 
knowledge. For instance, one may endorse Necessity of origin and the other may 
reject it. Or, to take a more disputed principle, one may accept Essentiality of 
composition and the other may reject it. So, the two philosophers may agree on all 
ordinary facts regarding, e. g., Isabella Rossellini’s biography or, using one of 
Kripke’s famous examples, the this-worldly profile of a certain lectern, but 
disagree on modal truths regarding them. Now, the objection runs, there appears 
to be no objective modal fact that would help us decide which of the two endorses 
the correct account – because, more generally, there appear to be no modal facts to 
speak of. Suppose, at least for heuristic reasons, that from a logical point of view 
the modal profile of an object is virtually unlimited, that we are free to associate 
any logical predicate with any logical subject whatsoever, except perhaps for cases 
that would lead in an uncontroversial manner to contradiction (e.g., “Isabella 
Rossellini is not Isabella Rossellini,” “Isabella Rossellini is younger than Ingrid 
Bergman and older than Ingrid Bergman,” and so on). This is pretty much the 
classical Humean view. But anyone who takes modality at least a little seriously 
would agree that we nevertheless enforce some restrictions on the logical space in 
order to determine an object’s modal profile. Say, few would accept that Isabella 
Rossellini, the actress, could have been a crocodile. Our two philosophers’ 
accounts would lead then to two different restrictions being enforced on the 
logical space of possibilities, thereby leading the two thinkers to accept 
incompatible modal statements as true. One rules out all scenarios where Isabella 
Rossellini is not the daughter of Ingrid Bergman and the other doesn’t. One allows 
cases where the lectern which is actually made of wood is made of iron (or of 
totally different pieces of wood), whereas the other rejects them. What the 
objection says is that the principles that ground these restrictions on possible 
scenarios do not (because they cannot) report on some modal facts or, at least, that 
whatever it is they report on, it doesn’t have the same objective status that 
ordinary facts have. As an explanation of why our modal claims are not objective 
(or thinker-independent), while not being wholly subjective or arbitrary either, 
the critic may follow some of the alternative accounts of modality and propose 
that there is some convention, some sort of conceptual truth or a simple habit-
induced shutdown of our imagination which engenders our modal intuitions.3 
                                                                
3 See Amie Thomasson, “Modal Normativism and the Methods of Metaphysics,” Philosophical 
Topics 35 (2007): 135-60, Amie Thomasson, “Norms and Necessity,” Southern Journal of 
Philosophy 51 (2013): 143-60, Robert Brandom, Between Saying and Doing: Towards an 
Analytic Pragmatism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), and Simon Blackburn, “Morals 
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The objection from the insolvability of (apparent) modal disagreement 
regarding the non-factual character of modal claims is, at least to my mind, a 
powerful one. Yet, there is one idea that resurfaced fairly recently in the literature 
regarding modal notions which may provide some hope for proponents of 
principle-based views. What some contemporary philosophers of modality hold is 
that the distinction between ordinary, non-modal facts and knowledge, on one 
side, and modal facts and knowledge, on the other, is a philosophical illusion. 
Specifically, the way this view may help reject the objection formulated above is 
by pointing out that if there is no separation between the modal and the non-
modal, the hypothesis of two thinkers agreeing about all ordinary facts, but 
disagreeing on modal ones, cannot stand. The two thinkers must disagree on some 
empirical fact as well, and it may be this empirical disagreement that helps us 
explain the modal disagreement (probably in conjunction with some further 
theoretical input). 
The no-separation idea has been developed in various ways in the last two 
decades or so, but in this paper I will be concerned only with what it can do in 
support of modal rationalism. As such, I will leave out explicit anti-rationalist 
views, such as Elder’s4 or Miščević’s5, that hold that there is no need for a priori 
principles in order to ground modal truth. The no-separation idea has been 
notably expressed in two different, though related, ways: (1) Modal claims are 
consequences of (our view on) ordinary descriptive sentences; and (2) Grasp of 
empirical terms used in ordinary descriptive sentences presupposes grasp of modal 
notions (this is what Brandom calls ‘the Kant-Sellars thesis’). The discussion of 
these two philosophical claims will consider their formulation in the work of Alan 
Sidelle (for thesis 1) and Robert Brandom (for thesis 2). One may object that these 
thinkers are not modal rationalists either (and, unlike Elder and Miščević, they are 
not even realists about modality), but I believe and hope to show that the 
significance of the two theses is better evinced in the arguments I will discuss. 
This has to do with my general outlook on the compatibility of the no-separation 
idea and modal rationalism. As the reader may have guessed, I am fairly sceptical 
about this pairing for reasons that will be explained in this paper. Accordingly, my 
target is not any of the philosophers mentioned in this paragraph, but rather 
                                                                                                                                       
and Modals,” in Essays in Quasi-Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 52-74 for 
theories of this sort. 
4 Crawford Elder, “An Epistemological Defence of Realism About Necessity,” Philosophical 
Quarterly 42 (1992): 317-36. 
5 Nenad Miščević, “Explanining Modal Intuition,” Acta Analytica 18 (2003): 5-41. 
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thinkers who are ontological realists about modality,6 while maintaining that 
there is no separation between the empirical and the modal realm, and also that 
(some of) our modal knowledge is underpinned by a priori principles.  
2. Modal Assertions as Consequences. Sidelle’s Argument 
In “Modality and Objects,”7 Alan Sidelle proposes an argument against 
metaphysical views which combine realism about objects with conventionalism 
about modality, such as Ted Sider’s position from Four Dimensionalism.8 We will 
call this combination of doctrines ‘the hybrid view’ from now on. The argument is 
developed as follows. 
Suppose one thinks that Socrates is essentially human, but his being so is a 
matter of convention. However, as a realist, one must believe that ‘Socrates’ refers 
to some thinker-independent object, viz., that Socrates is a mind-independent 
object (a human being, in this case). But suppose also that we had introduced 
another name purportedly for the same object, ‘Socrateez’ – which is an aggregate 
term that applies whenever all the elements in the aggregate exist. The question is: 
is Socrates the same with Socrateez, do the two names refer to one and the same 
object? Sidelle thinks that the realist must give an affirmative answer to this 
question. But if this is so, it opens the defender of the hybrid view to the following 
counterargument:9 
1. Socrates is essentially human. 
2. There could have been conventions applied to Socrates in virtue of which he 
would not have been essentially human. [by conventionalism about essences, and 
mind-independence about objects] 
3. In some such situations, Socrates is not (or ceases to be) human. [from (2)] 
4. Therefore Socrates is not essentially human. [from (3)] 
So, Socrates is essentially human, but Socrateez, who is one and the same 
object with Socrates, is not. And that is a contradiction. 
                                                                
6 Ontological realism about modality is not to be equated with the modal realism of David 
Lewis. The latter may be seen as an eccentric form of ontological realism that holds that possible 
worlds are real in the same way that our world is real, whereas generic ontological realism about 
modality just claims that modal statements are made true by objective modal facts. 
7 Alan Sidelle, “Modality and Objects,” Philosophical Quarterly 60 (2010): 109-25. 
8 Theodore Sider, Four Dimensionalism: an Ontology of Persistence and Time (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 207. 
9 Sidelle, “Modality and Objects,” 111. 
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One quick objection to this argument is that the conventionalist view of 
essence precludes us from using the ‘is essentially’ predicate without any 
specification. If this use was acceptable, then conventionalism across the board 
could run into the same problem. If ever two different sets of conventions 
individuated the same object, the same contradiction would arguably arise. But 
even if this last hypothesis doesn’t make sense, the defender of the hybrid view 
could still object that ‘is essentially’ from (1) doesn’t have the same meaning as ‘is 
essentially’ from (2) and, consequently, (4). She may insist that the deep meaning 
of the modal conventionalist position is that ‘is essentially P’ should never be used 
without adding the qualification ‘by convention X’. In this case, Socrates is 
essentially human by convention X, but not essentially human by convention Y. 
Never is he essentially human by convention X and not essentially human by 
convention X, so the contradiction doesn’t arise. But perhaps this is too easy or too 
vague an objection, so we should inspect closely the theoretical claims that Sidelle 
uses to defend his view, as they provide some deeper insights into his position. 
Sidelle considers a different fundamental objection to his argument: it just 
states the uncontroversial fact that we are able to provide non-modal conditions 
for the existence of an object that don’t carry any modal commitments for 
particular objects. To this objection he replies that “while merely actual conditions 
may tell us when we have an object, we need more to tell us, for any object, what 
makes it the object it is.”10 So, when considering an object, it is not sufficient to 
think only of the actual conditions that may help us distinguish it, but also of its 
persistence and possibility conditions that make the modal profile intrinsic to the 
object. The hybrid view only works in a static perspective about objects, according 
to Sidelle, but we should adopt a dynamic one.11 
Valid as it may be, this important point changes the whole story of Sidelle’s 
own argument. If the defender of the hybrid view accepts the fact that we need to 
integrate a temporal dimension to our metaphysics of individuals, she will also 
quite plausibly reject identifying Socrates the human being with Socrateez, the 
aggregate of elements, as long as the two conventions individuate objects with 
divergent histories. If, say, Socrateez is an aggregate of physical elements, namely 
of particles, then he/it is rather a part of the composite spatiotemporal individual 
that is Socrates the human being. Of course, by hypothesis, the defender of the 
hybrid view will hold that we can have two modal conventions regarding the 
same object, so we should find a better example. But if she is sensitive to the point 
Sidelle makes, the realist will also refuse to accept any two conventions that give 
                                                                
10 Sidelle, “Modality and Objects,” 111. 
11 Cf. Sidelle, “Modality and Objects,” 117. 
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us only temporarily overlapping objects. If this is so, and we are held to attach to 
the same object only modal conventions that trace an identical spatiotemporal 
itinerary, then there is no moment or period of time when (3) is true, that is, 
Socrates is not (or ceases to be) human, so Sidelle’s argument breaks down. 
What is more, I think Sidelle’s requirement of always having to consider 
the persistence and possibility conditions of objects is unnaturally strong. Let me 
elaborate on this claim. First of all, it is not clear that we need necessary 
conditions for persistence through time; sufficient conditions appear to be able to 
do all the work that is normally required. Suppose, for instance, that there is a 
small accident at Socrates’ birth that ends up with him having a small scar behind 
his left ear for all his life. Thus, being the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete that 
has a scar behind his left ear should suffice for identifying Socrates all through his 
lifetime, given that none of his male siblings had a similar scar. But this obviously 
reports a contingent fact about Socrates. Now, Sidelle would probably insist that 
this may work for singling out Socrates, but not for determining what kind of 
object he is. While this may appear to be a sensible philosophical requirement, it is 
not at all uncontroversial that it is indispensable for the realist. It may very well 
happen, as it often does, that the purportedly essential properties of the object (e. 
g., humanity, rationality, etc.) are not sufficient for individuating it and we should 
add contingent properties for singling it out, as in the example above. But this is 
not my concern here. The question is rather if necessary properties are needed at 
all in order to talk and think about an object and track it through time. As some 
externalists would probably hold, the temporal profile of an object may not be 
constrained by our knowledge of some necessary conditions for persistence. 
Admittedly, this may look awkward for the realist. If two different 
conventions are really about the same individual with the same history, then it is 
natural to suppose that there must be some deep common fact that makes this 
work, even if we don’t know what it is. But there is still a problem. Even if the 
defender of the hybrid view may be forced into admitting that some facts about 
persistence through time are not optional, there is still a long way to go before 
showing that this requirement should carry over to the modal case. Some 
theoretical input is needed at this point in order to better understand the 
implications of the claim that we need temporal and modal conditions for keeping 
track of objects. This claim regards two aspects: (a) a semantic dimension and (b) a 
metaphysical dimension. Arguably, Sidelle may be taken to defend the strong 
thesis that we need persistence and possibility conditions both at a semantic and at 
a metaphysical level. Now, in the temporal case, it seems plausible that a realist 
would be inclined to agree to a metaphysical constraint for persistence conditions, 
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but it is not clear at all that she should also be committed to the corresponding 
semantic constraint. All this has to do with the nature of the so-called referential 
terms, that is, proper names and natural kind terms. If the Kripke-Putnam theory 
or, more generally, some form of semantic externalism is right, then there are 
expressions in our language that are not tied to any type of descriptive content, 
including persistence and possibility conditions.12 So, names and natural kind 
terms may provide us with a way of referring to objects without any 
corresponding criteria.  
It is plausible that both the semantic and the metaphysical constraints break 
down in the modal case. The semantic commitment for modal conditions is 
straightforwardly dismissed if there are referential expressions that don’t have a 
descriptive semantic content. The metaphysical commitment may be similarly 
dismissed if, with Kripke, one holds that we don’t need criteria of transworld 
identification, but, pace Kripke, one also holds that there are no properties that 
should belong to an object in any possible situation. In order to support his claim, 
Sidelle needs a supplementary justification of why the realist cannot avoid 
commitment to essential properties, i.e., properties that an object must have in any 
possible scenario. At least from an epistemological point of view, there seems to be 
no such constraint on modal imagination, even for realists. Consequently, the 
hybrid view can be defended against Sidelle’s arguments. To sum things up, the 
realist is entitled to hold that we may refer to and keep track of objects without 
being in possession of some necessary conditions for doing that. Although the 
hybrid-view realist may run into some metaphysical trouble for persistence in the 
actual world, no such trouble should incur in the case of possible worlds/scenarios. 
No particularity of a general realist standpoint seems to be able to prevent the 
realist from entertaining divergent possible scenarios concerning the possession of 
a certain property by a certain object. 
What does this all mean for the argument from the insolvability of 
(apparent) modal disagreement? Well, it seems that in order to drive his point 
home, Sidelle needs too much of his own conventionalist perspective. He argues 
that we need persistence and modal conditions for keeping track of objects, but his 
claims can be countered both at a semantic and at a metaphysical level. If the 
Kripke-Putnam theory is correct, for instance, then we can refer to objects 
directly, without having to appeal to descriptive criteria. But perhaps we need 
persistence conditions for objecthood from a metaphysical standpoint. Even if this 
                                                                
12 Kripke, Naming and Necessity and Hilary Putnam, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’,” Minnesota 
Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7 (1975): 131-93 are the most important sources of Kripke-
Putnam semantic theories. 
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is right, it is still unclear that this constraint should carry over to the modal case, 
that we need (semantic or metaphysical) criteria for identifying an object in 
different possible situations. Without a substantial conventionalist commitment, 
Sidelle’s argument will not be able to get off the ground. Therefore, it doesn’t 
establish that objects necessarily have intrinsic modal profiles. 
In the following section, I will discuss a different approach to the critique of 
the separation between modal and empirical notions. This approach was 
propounded by Robert Brandom in his Between Saying and Doing. Brandom 
builds an argument for what he calls ‘the Kant-Sellars thesis’ – the claim that using 
empirical terms presupposes a grasp of modal distinctions – which we will now 
review. 
3. The Kant-Sellars Thesis 
Brandom formulates the Kant-Sellars thesis (KS from now on) in the following 
way: “The ability to use ordinary empirical descriptive terms such as ‘green,’ 
‘rigid,’ and ‘mass’ already presupposes grasp of the kinds of properties and relations 
made explicit by modal vocabulary.”13 As its name says, KS has been defended in 
less explicit versions by Kant and Sellars, but Brandom articulates his own case to 
support it. 
KS is related to Sidelle’s claim that we need persistence and possibility 
conditions for objects (i.e., every object must have a modal profile), but it runs 
deeper: descriptive terms are inherently modal, thereby licensing or precluding 
various counterfactual claims about the properties they name. If we did not have a 
counterfactual inferential profile associated with these notions, we would not be 
able to use them to acquire knowledge about the world. 
Brandom’s argument starts from the premise that every autonomous 
discursive practice must have an observational vocabulary. The second claim is 
that those who engage in discursive practices must be able to distinguish between 
materially good and materially bad inferences (‘material’ meaning that the 
inferences contain non-logical terms in an essential manner). If we are not able to 
determine the character of some inferences wherein some term is involved, that 
term has no cognitive content. But (third premise) material inference is non-
monotonic, which is to say it is defeasible by special circumstances. To take a 
simple example, I might be entitled to infer, based on the physical properties of 
the glass bottle in front of me, that if the bottle fell to the floor, it would break. 
Now, what Brandom says is that (obviously) this inference and similar ones don’t 
                                                                
13 Brandom, Between Saying and Doing, 96-97. 
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function as formal inferences in logical systems. If I add another premise, thereby 
defining a circumstance where gravity is weaker, or the floor is actually made of a 
soft material, or what have you, then I cannot draw the wanted conclusion. Every 
material inference has its own host of ‘unless’es. If the bottle falls to the floor, it 
will break, unless gravity is much weaker, unless the floor is made of cardboard, 
unless…We can certainly have an idea of what these defeasors should look like, 
but we are certainly not able to provide a complete list thereof. Fourth, many of a 
subject’s beliefs may only be justified as conclusions of material inferences. 
Finally, in order to count as a discursive practitioner, one must be epistemically 
responsible, that is, minimally committed to justifying one’s beliefs.14 
If our knowledge of the world works this way, then according to Brandom, 
it should yield an updating problem. Each time we modify our beliefs, this change 
may be relevant to the justification of every prior belief – it may act as a defeasor, 
or it may make the subject give up some premise she relied upon or a counter-
defeasor. Each potential change may ruin a whole edifice of beliefs. The way out 
of the updating problem cannot be to review all of one’s beliefs every time there is 
a change of belief, as this is practically impossible. So, the solution, according to 
Brandom, is to associate which each belief a set of material inferences in relation 
to which that belief may act as a defeasor. But this yields, for each material 
inference, a set of defeasors that defines the counterfactual robustness of that 
inference.15 
I recall at this point that I am interested in Brandom’s account as an 
argument against the idea that two people may agree about all the relevant 
empirical facts and disagree about the modal ones, which was a starting point for 
my doubts concerning the facticity of modal claims and disputes. Well, it certainly 
seems that Brandom’s account could be interpreted this way. For Brandom, the 
users of empirical vocabulary must have an idea of the counterfactual robustness 
of their ordinary descriptive terms. This in turn means that agreement about some 
empirical claim may be illusory if our two subjects disagree about all or most of 
the related counterfactual claims. 
However, I don’t think that Brandom’s account vindicates an objective 
notion of possibility, i.e. metaphysical possibility, and I don’t think it sets out to do 
that. Let me elaborate on these claims. I will use a short critical assessment by 
Stjernberg that raises some legitimate doubts about Brandom’s argument for KS.16 
                                                                
14 See Brandom, Between Saying and Doing, 106-08 for the detailed argument. 
15 See Brandom, Between Saying and Doing, 108-09. 
16 Fredrik Stjernberg, “Brandom's Five-Step Program for Modal Health,” in Proceedings of the 
Workshop on Bob Brandom's Recent Philosophy of Language: Towards an Analytic 
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The overarching idea is that the account is sketchy, which is to say it needs to be 
developed so that it explains adequately the way the updating process works, most 
notably the way we manage to delineate and use counterfactual profiles for 
empirical notions. This is correct, but we may suppose that Brandom’s sketch 
could be developed into a full-fledged account of the modal basis of our 
knowledge, as there is no manifest contradiction or conceptual tension therein. 
Now, one of Stjernberg’s criticisms that elaborates on the perceived sketchiness of 
Brandom’s account is that his line of reasoning is not strong enough to support the 
strong conclusion that we must know roughly the same counterfactuals if we are 
to count as epistemically responsible agents.17 Stjernberg claims that this 
conclusion is desirable for Brandom and that in order to be able to support it, we 
also need to show that “the use of a particular modal or counterfactual statement is 
justified, that there is some way to distinguish correct from incorrect use.”18 In 
other words, in order to be entitled to draw the strong conclusion from Brandom’s 
argument, we need some supplementary epistemological premise that reports on 
our ability to get a grip on objective possibility (i.e., something that justifies 
ontological realism about modality). 
I disagree with Stjernberg that the strong reading is the desirable conclusion 
of Brandom’s argument. If we frame the argument in the context of Brandom’s 
theory of modality, it appears that Brandom doesn’t need the strong version; 
moreover, it seems to run counter to his basic tenets. In Brandom’s view, KS 
should be interpreted in accordance with the idea that  
the expressive role characteristic of alethic modal vocabulary is to make explicit 
semantic or conceptual connections and commitments that are already implicit 
in the use of ordinary (apparently) non-modal empirical vocabulary.19  
So, it must be emphasized that Brandom sees modality as a fundamentally 
conceptual matter: our modal assertions are actually statements of rules 
concerning concept use. The idea of a correct use of modal and counterfactual 
notions, insofar as it supposedly tracks some real, objective possibility, is 
secondary at best. That is why Stjernberg’s weak reading of Brandom’s argument – 
with the conclusion that “we must be in agreement on some counterfactuals, if we 
                                                                                                                                       
Pragmatism, eds. Cristina Amoretti, Carlo Penco and Federico Pitto (Genoa: University of 
Genoa, Department of Philosophy, 2009), 18-22. 
17 Stjernberg, “Brandom’s Five-Step Program,” 21. 
18 Stjernberg, “Brandom’s Five-Step Program,” 21. 
19 Brandom, Between Saying and Doing, 99. 
Mihai Rusu 
182 
are to see each other as epistemically responsible and hence discursive creatures”20 
– seems more appropriate. 
However, I agree with Stjernberg that Brandom’s argument doesn’t 
discriminate between a correct and an incorrect use of counterfactuals; 
consequently, it does not (because it cannot) articulate a robust concept of 
metaphysical modality. But I don’t regard this as a shortcoming of Brandom’s 
account, for reasons just given. 
In a nutshell, the conclusion of this section is as follows. If KS is correct, 
then there cannot be empirical agreement and modal disagreement on strongly 
related matters. But KS is subtended by a conceptualist/expressivist perspective of 
modality. Our modal assertions articulate implicit rules concerning the structure 
and use of our concepts. A question remains however: couldn’t something like KS 
(some version of the no-separation idea) be made to work in the framework of 
ontological realism about modality? After all, realists such as Williamson and Hale 
are supporters of the intertwining of the modal and the non-modal.21 
I am fairly sceptical about the prospects of such an endeavour. While I don’t 
have a well-developed argument in support of my scepticism, I see very little 
ground to allow one to uphold KS outside a broadly Kantian framework. A more 
detailed realist account of the fusion and interplay of the empirical and the modal 
would be needed. For instance, Hale makes the no-separation idea a staple of his 
theory of modality, but he provides very little in the way of development and 
illustration of this unity. Remember how Brandom’s account works. We have 
modal concepts because we have rules for our concepts. That is why the updating 
problem is so important. Change occurs not only in the realm of ordinary beliefs; 
it may also affect the rules. This is where ‘reality’ appears to produce an effect on 
our modal faculty, whatever we take that to be. Now, for the conceptualist (in a 
broad sense) a change in our modal views just is a change in the rules, that is, a 
change in the structure of our ordinary concepts. But the ontological realist about 
modality would want to maintain that there are modal facts, which should also 
make her want to resist admitting that a change in our modal views always 
amounts to a change in the structure of our ordinary concepts. I see this as a 
strong reason for the realist to reject the no-separation idea, at least as it has been 
described in this paper. 
 
                                                                
20 Stjernberg, “Brandom’s Five-Step Program,” 20. 
21 See Timothy Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 137, and 
Bob Hale, Necessary Beings: an Essay on Ontology, Modality, and the Relations Between Them 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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4. Conclusion 
There may be some substance to the no-separation thesis – perhaps there is a 
modal dimension to our ordinary statements, and modal disagreement should be 
reflected in empirical disagreement. However, if (some of) Sidelle’s and Brandom’s 
views are right, modal disagreement has a theoretical nature: we disagree about 
the confines of objecthood or the definition of a notion. If we take 
conventionalism out of Sidelle’s argument, e. g., if we try to articulate it in a 
Kripke-Putnam semantic framework or if we try to make epistemological sense, so 
to say, from our modal scenarios, we see that the argument breaks down. 
Brandom’s approach is not adequate for supporting ontologically robust concepts 
of modality. The arguments of this paper may cause significant distress for the 
modal rationalist, but they should not bring her an irreparable defeat. The other 
party must be heard, but this means that more should be done in order to describe 
and explain the link between the a priori principles of modal knowledge and the 
purportedly mind-independent modal reality. More precisely, some way of 
deciding satisfactorily between the opposing sides of a substantial modal dispute 
must be discussed and theorized. Otherwise, concerns about the status of modal 
facts and modal knowledge may indeed prove defeating for principle-based 
accounts of modality. My sceptically motivated paper ends with this invitation.22 
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